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My aim in this chapter is to direct attention to a matter philosophers of
science barely examine let alone satisfactorily address: the relationship
between the philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge. Like
many things we take for granted, this relationship is not well under-
stood. Most philosophers, whether of science or the more traditional
sort, would respond that the philosophy of science is applied episte-
mology—that is to say, it brings the categories and tools of analytic
epistemology to bear on understanding the practices called science.
Sidney Morgenbesser was, I believe, voicing the conventional wisdom
when he quipped in ∞Ω∏∫ that ‘‘philosophy of science is epistemology
with scientific examples’’ (Morgenbesser ∞Ω∏π, xvi).∞ (There is, of
course, another aspect to the philosophy of science—traditionally
called ‘‘foundations’’ of science—that is seen not as applied epistemol-
ogy but rather as applied metaphysics, a topic I do not investigate
here.)
This probably all seems harmless enough, not least because of its
utter familiarity. But this way of construing the provenance of the
philosophy of science is not innocuous. To the contrary, the notion that
one can make sense of science by conceiving of it principally as episte-
mology teaching by example is not only hubris on the part of the
epistemologist—hubris after all is an occupational hazard of the phi-
losopher and thus forgivable—but also, I will argue, presupposes the
correctness of one particular approach within the philosophy of sci-
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ence, specifically epistemic realism, while denying legitimacy to vari-
ous other philosophies of science that have at least as distinguished a
track record as realism itself does. Still worse, the vision of philosophy
of science as applied epistemology forces us to treat as irrational many
of the most interesting and important evaluative strategies used in
sound science.
I argue that the philosophy of science is not, and should not be
conceived as, an exclusively or even principally epistemic activity. This
is because science is neither exclusively nor principally epistemic. I will
arrive at these interrelated conclusions by a slightly circuitous route. I
will begin by focusing on a familiar and specific example of the thesis
that philosophy of science is reducible to epistemology. I refer to the
conception of the philosophy of science as rational reconstruction,
especially as that notion was developed by Hans Reichenbach (and, to
a lesser degree, by Rudolf Carnap) in the ∞Ω≥≠s and ∞Ω∂≠s. I will show
that Reichenbachian reconstructions are not simply, as some might
have supposed, broad-based case studies of philosophically interesting
episodes in science but are instead subject to severe constraints with
respect to which bits of real science are reconstructible and which are
not. I will show that these constraints are imposed by the acute limita-
tions of the tools of epistemology.
The first point to establish, and it is easy work, is that Reichenbach
saw rational reconstructions as devices for identifying the epistemi-
cally salient features of any given scientific episode. This means that
they are—and this is the first important thing to note about them—
rational reconstructions only in a very attenuated and idiosyncratic
sense. As conceived by Reichenbach in the opening chapter of his Ex-
perience and Prediction, rational reconstructions are not attempts to
clean up the details of a scientific episode by showing how or to what
extent the elements of the episode promoted the ends of the investiga-
tor. That sort of instrumental rationality is patently not what Reich-
enbach had in mind when he talked about rational reconstructions.
Rather, for him, the freight that the term rational carries in that phrase
was purely epistemic. He argued that the only features of any actual
situation that appropriately belonged in a rational reconstruction were
those bearing on the truth or the falsity of the theory or hypothesis
being evaluated in the episode in question. I repeat: for Reichenbach,
rational reconstructions were purely and simply epistemic reconstruc-
tions. Insofar as the actual case involved activities or principles that,
∞∏ Larry Laudan
however rational in their own right, had nothing demonstrable to do
with determining the truth or falsity of an hypothesis, those activities
and principles found no rightful place in the so-called rational recon-
struction of the case. The same point applies to Reichenbach’s oft-
mentioned but little understood distinction between the contexts of
discovery and justification. This set of polarities marked, for him, not
different temporal stages in an investigator’s research but simply the
difference between a descriptively rich but philosophically irrelevant
account of an episode of the sort you might see in a history book and
the very different but purely epistemic account that was to constitute,
for him, the rational reconstruction of the episode. For Reichenbach
the context of justification consisted of all and only those factors essen-
tial to the epistemic evaluation of the theory in question. Everything
else—that is, everything not epistemic—was relegated to the context
of discovery and consigned to the psychologist or the anthropologist
for further investigation. The philosopher’s interest in the episode was
limited strictly to those elements that passed epistemic muster.
Now, if you support the idea that philosophy of science is applied
epistemology, you may find nothing unseemly in Reichenbach’s delin-
eation of the task of philosophy of science as that of working with
rational (understood now as epistemic) reconstructions of episodes
rather than the episodes themselves. Besides, you might add, any philo-
sophically interesting account of any human practice will have to sim-
plify and idealize the blooming, buzzing confusion of the real world in
order to have a manageable unit of analysis. I have no problems with
simplifications, not even with oversimplifications, when they serve a
useful purpose. But what is fishy here is that much of what drives
scientific activity, even scientific activity at its rational best, are con-
cerns that have no epistemic justification in a strict sense and that must
be excluded from rational reconstructions of science as understood by
Reichenbach and most of the others who have construed the philoso-
phy of science as applied epistemology. The rest of this chapter will
attempt to deliver on this claim. I aim to show that many, and arguably
most, of the historically important principles of theory appraisal used
by scientists have been, though reasonable and appropriate in their
own terms, utterly without epistemic rationale or foundation.
I focus on one family of examples, among many that I might have
chosen. My central argument will depend on noting the frequency and
persistence with which scientists insist on evaluating theories by asking
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about their scope and their generality. Several familiar and important
rules of thumb in theory appraisal speak to such concerns. For exam-
ple, acceptable theories are generally expected to explain the known
facts in the domain (‘‘saving the phenomena’’), explain different kinds
of facts (consilience of inductions), explain why their rivals were suc-
cessful (the Sellars-Putnam rule), and capture their rivals as limiting
cases (the Boyd-Putnam rule). I trust no reader will dispute the ubiq-
uity of rules of this sort in evaluating scientific theories. The question is
whether such rules have, or can be conceived to have, any grounding in
epistemology per se.
Consider the first rule on this list, to explain the known facts in the
domain. Steady-state cosmology was rejected in the ∞Ω∏≠s not because
it had been refuted but because it offered no account of the cosmic
background radiation discovered at Bell Labs. The uniformitarian the-
ories of Hutton, Playfair, and Lyell were rejected by most nineteenth-
century geologists, not because they faced massive refutations, but
because they steadfastly refused to say anything about how the earth
might have evolved from its primitive initial condition to the condition
of habitability. Plate tectonic theory triumphed in the ∞Ω∏≠s over stable
continent geologies principally because the former, but not the latter,
could explain long-familiar patterns of continental fit and similarities
of fauna and flora between the Old World and the new. Galileo fa-
mously argued for the rejection of Ptolemaic astronomy because it
could not explain why Jupiter should have moons or why the sun
should have spots. He plumped for the Copernican alternative because
it could explain such facts about the solar system. The Jovian moons
and the sun’s spots did not refute any claim in Ptolemy’s Almagest.
Their potency derived from Ptolemy’s system evidently lacking any
mechanism for making sense of such phenomena.
More generally, it should be uncontroversial that scientists fre-
quently argue for one theory over another if the former can explain or
predict something about the world not accounted for by its rivals. I
daresay no one regards this as a specious form of argument against a
theory. Few would quarrel either with the notion that a theory is, all
else being equal, better if it can explain or predict facts from different
domains or if it can show its rivals to be limiting cases. This is, nonethe-
less, a form of argument that has, and can have, no epistemic founda-
tion. Our other three rules about the scope of a theory exhibit the same
disconnection from epistemology.
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None of these rules can have an epistemic rationale since it is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a statement that it exhibit any
of these attributes. That a statement fails to explain a fact with which it
is strictly compatible is no argument against its being true. Indeed,
most true statements do not exhibit this virtue. Similarly, the fact that a
statement explains only one type of fact, rather than several, is no
reason to believe that it is false. Indeed, most true statements do not
explain different kinds of facts. Likewise, the fact that one statement
cannot explain why one of its contraries worked so well is no argument
against its truth since most true statements cannot explain why their
contraries, if successful, are successful. Finally, we do not generally
expect true statements to be such that some of their contraries can be
shown to be limiting cases of them.
If these attributes of scope and generality are virtues, and I believe
they are, they are not epistemic virtues. They address questions about
the breadth and range of our theories rather than questions about their
truth or probability. (It is true that philosophers have sometimes tried
to describe these virtues of scope as epistemic virtues. Recall, for in-
stance, William Whewell’s labored but unsuccessful efforts to show
that consilience-achieving inductions are bound to be true. Boyd and
Putnam tried to argue that capturing a predecessor as a limiting case
was an argument for the truth of a theory.) As I have argued elsewhere
(Lauden ∞Ω∫∞), no one has shown that any of these rules is more likely
to pick out true theories than false ones. It follows that none of these
rules is epistemic in character.
Indeed, one can piece together a perfectly general proof that these
attributes cannot be epistemic indicators. I do not set much store by
such arguments myself, but for those who do, they look like this:
Let T be some theory exhibiting one of the virtues of scope, v. Now, T will
have many consequences; and infinitely many of those consequences will lack
v, since many of the logical consequences of a statement of broad scope will
fail to exhibit such scope. Focus on any one of those consequences, which we
will call c∞. Now, if T is true, c∞ must likewise be true. If T is highly probable or
verisimilar, c∞ must be even more probable or have more verisimilitude. In
short, thanks to the truth-preserving character of entailment, c∞ will neces-
sarily possess all the epistemic virtues of T, while failing to have v. It follows
that v cannot be an epistemic virtue since statements failing to exhibit v (such
as c∞) are at least as solid epistemically as statements like T, that exemplify v.
This fact should discomfort no one save the epistemologist. It does not
show that subjective values drive science or that ‘‘merely aesthetic’’
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yardsticks predominate. What it does show is that scientists have ex-
pectations about good theories that go well beyond worries about their
veracity. If you have any residual doubts on this score, simply ask
yourself whether any serious scientist would countenance every state-
ment that he or she believed to be true to be an acceptable theory.
Scientists may regard truth as an important virtue (we can argue about
that another time). But what cannot be gainsaid is that there are other
virtues of theories that loom at least as large in theory evaluation as
truth does. By definition, these cannot be epistemic virtues since many
false statements exhibit them and many true statements do not. By
definition, they can find no place in a so-called rational reconstruction
of science driven by an epistemic agenda.
Bas van Fraassen famously argued that a theory does not have to be
true to be good. We can add to that dictum a new twist: a theory does
not have to be false to be bad. A theory may be bad because it fails the
test of possessing the relevant nonepistemic virtues. In other words, we
expect our theories to do much work for us, work of a sort that most
merely true statements fail to do. However, we may cash out precisely
what that additional work is, and when we do so, we will move beyond
the epistemic realm into one I call cognitive but nonepistemic values.
Such values are constitutive of science in the sense that we cannot
conceive of a functioning science without them, even though they fail
to be intelligible in the terms of the classical theory of knowledge.
These values have nothing to do with philosophical semantics or with
justification conditions, as usually understood. For that reason, I call
them cognitive virtues or values, of which the epistemic virtues form a
proper (I almost said uninteresting) subset. I have focused thus far on
one family of cognitive virtues having to do with the range or scope of
theories. Another family of such concerns is whether, in Phillip Kit-
cher’s language, the theories in question achieve ‘‘explanatory unifica-
tion.’’≤ Like the virtues of scope and generality, the virtue of explana-
tory unification cannot—counter to claims that Kitcher has sometimes
made about it—be a truth-related virtue since it is obvious that every
unifying theory, T, will entail non-unifying counterparts, T∞*, T≤*, . . . ,
Tn*, which must be true if T is true. If scientists regard T as a better
theory than any of those weaker counterparts—and they invariably
will—this must be because T possesses, and Ti lacks, virtues that are
nonepistemic.
If all of this is even half correct, we see that the Reichenbachian
formula for putting together a rational reconstruction is fatally re-
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stricted and that this restriction speaks to the limits of application and
relevancy of epistemology itself. What goes on in science at its best
eludes the resources of the theory of knowledge to explain or to justify.
Moreover, the Reichenbachian formulation declares to be philosophi-
cally irrelevant—mere fodder for the psychologist, the anthropologist,
and the sociologist—many of the most important factors that go into
theory evaluation in the sciences. Using Reichenbach’s own language,
my criticism is that he shunts far too much into the context of discov-
ery and leaves little more than bare bones in the context of justification.
If, however, we were to understand rational reconstruction as a
technique for analyzing science using the cognitive values that con-
stitute it, not just the epistemic values, the line of demarcation between
these two contexts would shift drastically. The context of justification
would now recognize concerns about scope, generality, and range of
application—and possibly explanatory scope as well—as a part of the
rational reconstruction of any episode. The fact that such factors are
nonepistemic would be neither here nor there, since rational recon-
structions in terms of cognitive values would not, on my proposal, be
limited to strictly epistemic factors. Imre Lakatos once argued that the
appropriate criterion for evaluating the adequacy of a rational recon-
struction of an episode in science involves asking how much of the
activity of the scientists involved is captured by the rational reconstruc-
tion. By that yardstick, cognitively based reconstructions are clearly
preferable to epistemically based ones.
But much more is at stake here than what sort of rational recon-
structions we countenance. As I said at the outset, the notion of a
rational reconstruction is merely a stalking horse for a larger target of
my critique. I refer, of course, to analytic epistemology itself. I submit
that once we consider the role that issues of scope, generality, co-
herence, consilience, and explanatory power play in the evaluation of
scientific theories, it becomes clear that science is an activity only mar-
ginally or partially epistemic in character. Because that is so, the in-
stinct to reduce the philosophical analysis of science to epistemic terms
alone—and there are entire philosophies of science (Bayesianism, for
example) committed to doing just that—must be resisted.
Likewise infected by the reduction-to-epistemology bug is the whole
of the statistical theory of error. As everyone knows, statisticians rec-
ognize only two types of error: accepting a false hypothesis and reject-
ing a true one. But, of course, once we see that science has aims other
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than the truth, we recognize that there are whole families of error types
associated with each of the relevant cognitive values. Thus, a scientist
may accept as explanatory a theory that is not explanatory and reject
as nonexplanatory a theory that is. Likewise, a scientist may wrongly
believe a theory to be capable of explaining different types of phe-
nomena. These errors—which find no place in the contemporary the-
ory of error—can be just as fatal to a theory as the more familiar errors
of accepting the false and rejecting the true. Statisticians do not recog-
nize these errors as errors because they are not epistemic errors. The
error statistician, like the Reichenbachian rational reconstructor, takes
his cues entirely from the epistemologist. That would be intelligible if
and only if we had reason to suppose that the only demand scientists
appropriately made of their theories was that they be true. We have no
reason for such a premise. Consider, for example, that most scientists
would reject, or at least consider badly flawed, a theory that failed to
explain prominent facts in its intended domain of application, however
good that theory was at capturing the facts it chose to explain. Error
statisticians can no more make sense of such an appraisal than epis-
temologists can. Since scientists do make these additional demands on
a theory, and have good reasons for doing so, it is time that the statisti-
cians, like the epistemologists, recognized how severely limited the
tools are that they currently bring to the task of explicating scientific
rationality. I was sorely tempted to make the same observation about
the Bayesians who, like the error statisticians, are fixated on adjusting
probability assignments, and indifferent to the role of values in theory
assessment other than that of avoiding a Dutch book and falling into
losing betting strategies about the truth. I said I was tempted, but I
know better, since ingenious Bayesians, like Paleozoic omnivores, can
find some way of digesting almost anything in their path.
By way of summary of the argument thus far: We would like to have
theories that are true, elusive as that ideal may be. But we would also
like theories that are of great generality, that focus on the things we are
particularly interested in understanding, that explain as well as predict,
and that consolidate existing successes while moving us beyond them.
Of all these matters save the first, the epistemologist knows little or
nothing. Because, like the early Wittgenstein, epistemologists cannot
speak of things they know not; they must maintain a studied silence
with respect to most of the values that drive scientific research.
To this point, I have said nothing about the third element in my title,
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the social. This is perhaps just as well since my thoughts on that topic
are more fluid than on the other two. But if forced to fulfill the contract
implicit in my title, here is what I would say, at least on Thursdays:
There is a century-long philosophical tradition, dating back at least to
Marx and Mannheim, of supposing that theories whose acceptance
seems to involve exclusively epistemic values do not require the same
sort of social-psychological explanation as theories lacking the episte-
mic virtues. Recall that the whole theory of ideology was developed
specifically to explain why people came to believe notions for which
there were no compelling epistemic arguments. Strictly speaking, there
is something wrong with this way of proceeding since epistemic factors
themselves function in, and evolve out of, social interactions among
inquirers. In that very broad sense, every human artifact, including
human beliefs and conventions about belief authentication, is grounded
in social processes of communication, negotiation, and consensus for-
mation. But this sense of the term social is so broad as to be vacuous.
What I think Reichenbach had in mind, when he identified the context
of discovery as the appropriate domain of the social, is the idea that
social processes of belief fixation that lack an epistemic rationale are of
no philosophic interest (except perhaps as sociopathologies) and their
study should be left wholly to the social scientists. By contrast, thought
Reichenbach, where there is an epistemic justification for a belief, the
philosopher has a legitimate interest in exploring that justification and
in arguing the relevance of that justification to the belief itself. If we are
minded to draw a line between the social and the rational along these
lines, my own suggestion, of course, would be that the philosopher
should lay claim to interest in all beliefs for which there is a cognitive
rationale, as opposed to only those beliefs for which there is an episte-
mic rationale. Unlike Mannheim, who defined the scope of the sociol-
ogy of knowledge in terms of beliefs for which no epistemically compel-
ling rationale exists, I would prefer to see that scope defined in terms of
beliefs for which there is no cognitive rationale. Still, as I said earlier, my
views on the relationship of the cognitive to the social are too complex,
and too tentative, to be reduced to a simple formula.
What I have no hesitation about is my insistence on the explanatory
poverty of purely epistemic values and the resultant need to talk philo-
sophically about science in categories that go well beyond the merely
epistemic.
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N O T E S
∞. During the late ∞Ω∏≠s, Lakatos frequently made similar observations during
his seminars at the London School of Economics. 
≤. Kitcher has formulated this argument in many places; for its most detailed
elaboration see Kirchner (∞ΩΩ≥).
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